The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

June 2017

Running the Race: An Evaluation of Post-Race-tothe-Top Modifications to Teacher Tenure Laws and
a Recommendation for Future Legislative Changes
Kimberly M. Rippeth

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rippeth, Kimberly M. (2017) "Running the Race: An Evaluation of Post-Race-to-the-Top Modifications to
Teacher Tenure Laws and a Recommendation for Future Legislative Changes," Akron Law Review: Vol. 50 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 6.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Rippeth: Running the Race
6- RIPPETH MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/4/2017 10:31 AM

RUNNING THE RACE: AN EVALUATION OF POST-RACETO-THE-TOP MODIFICATIONS TO TEACHER TENURE
LAWS AND A RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Kimberly M. Rippeth 1

I.
II.

III.

IV.

Introduction ....................................................................... 142
Race to the Top—Setting the Scene for Tenure Reform ... 145
A. Teacher Tenure Laws Explained .................................. 145
1. The Protections of Due Process ............................. 146
2. Probationary Periods Before a Teacher is
Awarded Tenure .................................................... 149
B. The Pendulum of Teacher Tenure Reform from
1990-2010 ................................................................... 151
1. No Child Left Behind ............................................ 151
2. Race to the Top ...................................................... 152
State Legislatures’ Response to Race to the Top—
Linking Teacher Evaluations and Teacher Employment .. 154
A. Push Toward a Link Between Objective Data and
Employment Decisions ............................................... 154
B. Legislative Changes in Response to Concerns
Related to Effectiveness .............................................. 156
1. Making it Easier to Dismiss Ineffective
Teachers ................................................................. 156
2. Making it More Difficult for Teachers to
Achieve Tenure...................................................... 157
3. Eliminating Seniority as a Factor for School
Districts to Consider When Downsizing ............... 158
Evaluating the Modification and the Options That
States Have Going Forward ............................................... 159

1. Kimberly M. Rippeth is a J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron School of Law, 2017.
The author would like to give special thanks to Professor Elizabeth Shaver for her guidance,
feedback, and support throughout the writing process.

141

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 6
6- RIPPETH MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

142

V.

VI.

AKRON LAW REVIEW

5/4/2017 10:31 AM

[50:141

A. Eliminating Tenure Completely is an Impractical
Option ......................................................................... 159
B. Use of Performance Evaluation Methods Present
both Practical and Constitutional Problems ................ 163
1. Using Performance-based Evaluations Poses
Several Practical Concerns .................................... 165
2. Using Value-added Models Poses Due Process
Concerns ................................................................ 167
3. Peer-Review Evaluations are a Viable
Alternative to Value-Added Models...................... 168
C. Extended Probationary Periods ..................................... 170
Recommendation: A Road Map for Future Teacher
Tenure Modification .......................................................... 172
A. Require Teachers to Complete a Five-Year
Probationary Period .................................................... 172
B. Utilize Peer-Evaluations in Making Employment
Decisions ..................................................................... 173
C. Prohibit Districts from Considering Seniority in
Reduction-in-Force Decisions .................................... 174
Conclusion ......................................................................... 174

I. INTRODUCTION
Nationwide, teacher tenure laws are under attack. In recent years,
there has been an increasing amount of discussion on the topic of teacher
tenure laws and their impact on teachers’ and students’ performance in
public primary and secondary schools. The case that recently brought the
issue of teacher tenure laws to the forefront of the public’s attention was
Vergara v. State. In this case, a California Superior Court tentatively
ruled that the state’s teacher tenure laws were unconstitutional because
they violated students’ equal protection rights. 2
The case was initiated by a group of nine students from a California
public school who challenged five of California’s teacher tenure
statutes. 3 The students claimed that the five statutes granted “grossl[y]

2. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 Cal. Super. LEXIS 176, at *14, *18-19 (June 10,
2014) (tentative opinion).
3. Id. at *4.
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ineffective teachers” continued employment in public schools. 4 They
also argued that a disproportionate number of ineffective teachers were
located in schools serving “predominately low-income and minority
students,” thus negatively affecting the students’ right to equal access to
a quality education. 5 The court agreed with the students and found that
“both students and teachers [we]re unfairly, unnecessarily, and for no
legally cognizable reason (let alone a compelling one), disadvantaged by
the current Permanent Employment Statute.” 6
Reactions to this court’s ruling were strong, and many predicted
that it would have negative consequences on future tenure law
litigation. 7 While the trial court’s opinion was most recently overruled
by the California Second District Court of Appeal, Division 2 8 many
states had already made reforms to teacher tenure laws before and during
the pendency of the case.9
The response to these changes has been a wave of litigation
challenging the constitutionality of the laws, not only based on students’
constitutional rights—as in Vergara—, but also based on teachers’
interest in employment and due process rights. For example, a court in
North Carolina ruled that the state’s teacher tenure modification, which
eliminated the forty-year system by which teachers could be fired for
only “poor performance, immorality, or insubordination” and after a
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
See, e.g., Linda Deutsch, Judge strikes down California teacher tenure, AP TOP NEWS
PACKAGE (June 10, 2014), https://www.ebscohost.com (search for “Judge strikes down California
teacher tenure”); Juliet Linderman & Travis Loller, Reaction to California teacher tenure ruling,
NEWSWIRES (June 10, 2014), https://www.ebscohost.com (search for “Reaction to California
teacher tenure ruling”); Mike Corder, Plaintiffs ask court to affirm teacher-tenure, layoff ruling,
NEWSWIRES (June 24, 2015), https://www.ebscohost.com (search for “Plaintiffs ask court to affirm
teacher-tenure”); Kimberly Hefling, Some states roll back teacher tenure protections, AP
FINANCIAL NEWS (June 12, 2014), https://www.ebscohost.com (search for “Some states roll back
teacher tenure protections”); PBS News Hour: Teacher tenure rules are in state of flux across the
nation, (PBS television broadcast Nov. 29, 2014), www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/teacher-tenurerules-state-flux. Kevin G. Welner, Silver Lining’s Casebook: How Vergara’s Backers May Lose by
Winning, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 121, 137 (2015) (stating that the generallyaccepted method for such a political and social shift is through legislation or executive action, and,
by striking down California’s tenure laws, the Vergara Court has opened the door to other students
who wish to exercise their rights to equal protection with respect to education).
8. Vergara v. State, No. B258589, 2016 WL 4443590, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016)
(holding that “[p]laintiffs failed to establish that the challenged statutes violate equal protection,
primarily because they did not show that the statutes inevitably cause a certain group of students to
receive an education inferior to the education received by other students.”).
9. PBS News Hour: Teacher tenure rules are in state of flux across the nation, (PBS
television broadcast Nov. 29, 2014), www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/teacher-tenure-rules-stateflux.
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hearing to challenge their termination, was unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated constitutional protections of contract rights. 10
This Comment analyzes the various legislative modifications and
resulting judicial actions and commentaries to shed light on the
underlying issues regarding teacher tenure and the practical application
of those issues to school districts across the country. In doing so, this
Comment reflects on the goals of the legislative modifications and the
success with which those goals have been accomplished. Finally, in the
general wave of changes to teacher tenure laws, this Comment seeks to
determine the best scheme of teacher tenure laws and, in effect, propose
modifications for states that might undertake a revision of existing
teacher tenure laws.
In order to understand the issues at stake in drafting these laws and
to identify the best method for addressing those issues, it is important to
first understand the teacher tenure system and the reasons for its
implementation, evolution, and preservation in American public school
systems. Therefore, Section I of this Comment provides an explanation
and history of the teacher tenure system as well as the attitudes toward
it. 11 Section I also traces the impact that recent education reforms—
namely the No Child Left Behind Act and the Race to the Top
initiative 12—have had on teacher tenure.
Section II reviews recent modifications to teacher tenure laws
throughout the nation as a result of the push toward education reform.
These modifications have been categorized and examined according to
the effects that they seek to accomplish, as follows: 1) states that made it
easier to dismiss tenured teachers; 13 2) states that made it more difficult
to achieve tenure status; 14 and 3) states that have eliminated
consideration of tenure status from reduction in force decisions. 15

10. Emery P. Dalesio, Judge strikes down new NC teacher tenure law, NEWSWIRES (May 16,
2014), https://www.ebscohost.com (search for “Judge strikes down new NC teacher tenure law”).
11. See PROCON.ORG, Should Teachers Get Tenure?, http://teachertenure.procon.org (last
visited Aug. 21, 2015). There is great debate over whether tenure should be offered to teachers at
all. The debate for or against granting tenure to public school teachers turns on the conflict between
wanting to protect teachers from being unjustly fired and, therefore, giving them more freedom in
the classroom and wanting to ensure that bad teachers are not insulated from termination due to
difficult procedures and expensive litigation.
12. See Hefling, supra note 7 (attributing the teacher tenure debate to the addition of teacher
evaluation systems “propelled by Obama administration-led incentives”).
13. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1270 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.33(3)
(West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-28-7.5-1(b)(1-6) (West 2011).
14. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.81 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
38.83b (West 2011).
15. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1275 (West 2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 24-
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Next, Section III evaluates the different modifications based on
their real-world application and the reactions of the public and judiciary.
In the aftermath of wide-spread modification to teacher tenure laws, the
courts have intervened to protect the rights of teachers negatively
affected by arbitrary or wrongful termination. Thus, this section includes
an analysis of judicial actions that highlight the legal principles at play in
tenure reform, specifically, concerns for due process and contract rights.
This section also highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each
type of modification, while weighing the real-world costs and benefits.
Finally, Section IV culminates in a recommendation for states to
follow in future modifications to teacher tenure laws. The proposal
recommends that states continue to grant tenure only after a lengthy
probationary period of five years. Additionally, tenure status should only
be utilized by administrators and board members in reduction-in-force
employment decisions where evaluations are unable to distinguish
between two individuals.
Further, the recommendation provides for the use of performancebased evaluations such that standardized testing weighs minimally in
determinations, while peer review evaluations constitute the bulk of the
determining weight in the evaluations. In order to limit the reliance on
performance-based evaluations, the proposal urges policymakers to
combat the concerns of reliability and error in the objective measures of
effectiveness by providing a subjective element. The proposal stresses
the benefits of placing teachers back in control of their profession and
encouraging both accountability and assistance among peer teachers.
II. RACE TO THE TOP—SETTING THE SCENE FOR TENURE REFORM
A. Teacher Tenure Laws Explained
Before one can understand the current issues related to teacher
tenure laws and their implications for future policymakers, it is first
necessary to examine the teacher tenure system as a whole: what it is,
where it has been, and how it got to this critical juncture in its history.
While tenure is an often-debated topic on university campuses, tenure
has a presence in public elementary and secondary schools. Teacher
tenure laws have been in place in American elementary and secondary
public schools for almost 100 years. 16 During the early 20th century,
12 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 380.1248(a) (West 2011).
16. E.g. Molly Robertson, Blaming Teacher Tenure is Not the Answer, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 463,
464 (2015); Kathy Christie & Jennifer Dounay Zinth, Updated, Teacher Tenure or Continuing
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there was demand for a system that would protect teachers from being
terminated without cause or for wrongful reasons such as discrimination
based on race, gender, age, marital status 17 or “nepotism, political
favoritism, and arbitrary dismissals.” 18
In order to protect teachers from such threats to their employment,
states implemented tenure laws that provided protection in the form of
due process protection as discussed herein. In other words, tenure laws
granted teachers continued interests in employment until such time as
dismissal was appropriate based on very limited causes. Teachers gained
this protection after the successful completion of a designated term of
service during which they could be dismissed without due process
protections.
1. The Protections of Due Process
Essentially, after the prescribed probationary period, teacher tenure
laws protect teachers from unfair firing by implementing safeguards that
prevent termination once tenure status is achieved. In other words,
tenure allows teachers the employment protections of due process. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals from
being deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without first being given
due process under the law. 19 Accordingly, a tenured teacher must receive
notice before the school district can terminate the teacher’s
employment. 20 Additionally, the teacher must be given a statement
describing the reasons for the termination, which in some states is
limited to a list of certain acceptable reasons for termination.21 Further,
decisions to dismiss a tenured teacher are subject to a hearing process
that allows the teacher to challenge or even appeal the school district’s
decision. 22
Proponents of teacher tenure laws praise the protections they

Contract Laws, EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, 1 (Aug. 2011)
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/94/93/9493.pdf (stating that the first teacher tenure law was
passed in New Jersey more than 85 years ago).
17. Robertson, supra note 16.
18. Christie, supra note 16.
19. Elizabeth Powell, The Quest for Teacher Quality: Early Lessons from Race to the Top
and State Legislative Efforts Regarding Teacher Evaluations, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1061, 1074-75
(2013).
20. Christie, supra note 16.
21. Id.; 2-6 EDUCATION LAW § 6.06, FACULTY AND STAFF TENURE, LexisNexis (2015).
22. Kathy Christie & Jennifer Dounay Zinth, Updated, Teacher Tenure or Continuing
Contract Laws, EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, 16 (Aug. 2011)
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/94/93/9493.pdf.
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provide as a necessary way to combat the potentially harmful effects of
arbitrary employment decisions and encourage better teaching
practices. 23 One argument is that tenure fosters better teachers because
the security makes them feel more comfortable innovating in the
classroom and advocating for students without the fear of retribution in
the form of termination. 24 Teachers who have achieved tenure “feel free
to exercise leadership” 25 and to engage in classroom discussions and
methodologies without “self-censoring” out of fear. 26
On the contrary, opposition to teacher tenure policies is rooted in
the idea that such policies constitute a method by which ineffective
teachers are insulated from termination. 27 While most tenure laws
provide a process for terminating ineffective teachers, those systems are
often criticized as inefficient.28 The procedures are often costly and
time-consuming, and therefore, they do not act as a practical way to
combat the fear that tenure prevents bad teachers from being
terminated. 29
Even early teacher tenure policies allowed for tenured teachers to
be dismissed on grounds of misconduct (generally of an illegal nature)
or poor performance. 30 However, even where tenure has been
23. PROCON.ORG, Should Teachers Get Tenure?, 11, http://teachertenure.procon.org (last
visited Aug. 21, 2015).
24. Id.; See also Julie Rowland, Vergara and the complexities of teacher employment
policies, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, May 2015.
25. Margaret E. Harris, Teachers are “Different,” EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 415, 416
(April 1944).
26. Martin Essex, What Does Academic Freedom Mean for Elementary and Secondary
Teachers?, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 237, 238-39 (Jan. 1952) (describing the American
education system as an environment conducive to an “honest search for the truth” that is threatened
by groups wanting to “pre-empt the public school to teach [their] particular objectives”).
27. Should Teachers Get Tenure?, supra note 23.
28. See George Skelton, California teacher tenure finally a major election issue, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014) http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-cap-educationvergara-20140911-column.html (stating that one expert testified in the Vergara case that a poor
instructor costs a school district “$1.4 billion in lifetime earnings,” while another testified that “the
L.A. Unified School District wanted to fire 350 teachers, but couldn’t because of ‘torturous’
dismissal hurdles.”); Laurel Shaper Walters, More states yank teacher-tenure rug, LAS VEGAS SUN
(May 6, 1996) http://lasvegassun.com/news/1996/may/06/more-states-yank-teacher-tenure-rug/
(stating that tenure makes firing long-serving, but ineffective teachers “costly and time-consuming”
and referencing an anecdote about a high school math teacher unable to do algebra whose
termination cost the school $700,000).
29. Patrick McGuinn, The Time is Right for Teacher-Tenure Reform, EDUCATION WEEK
(May 3, 2010) http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/05/03/31mcguinn.h29.html (commentary)
(the expansion of teacher tenure protections have “made it so difficult and costly for districts to
dismiss tenured teachers that they now rarely attempt to do so, even when serious concerns about a
teacher’s effectiveness arise.”).
30. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CAL. L. REV. 75,
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historically awarded to teachers deemed “satisfactory” or where teachers
could be fired for “incompetence,” such ratings were rarely given. 31 One
reason is that these terms were not clearly-defined. 32 Without a clear
standard defining the acceptable reasons for dismissal, school districts
faced considerable difficulty utilizing those standards to terminate
ineffective teachers. 33 Historically, teacher evaluations were based on
the subjective determinations of a principal or other administrator.34
Further, these evaluations considered a variety of factors that were not
always closely related to effectiveness. 35 In 2002, only six states
required that student performance be considered in teacher evaluations.
Instead, other considerations included: teaching methods and techniques,
ability to maintain classroom behavior and discipline, and mastery of the
class content. 36 However, modern education reforms, as discussed
herein, have called upon school districts, and ultimately state
legislatures, to utilize more objective and sophisticated measures of
teacher effectiveness. 37
Tenured teachers were also traditionally rewarded for their seniority
when it came time for school districts to decrease their work force in
response to reduction-in-force cuts. 38 Also referred to as “last-in, firstout” policies, these seniority policies required school districts to dismiss
probationary and less-senior teachers before those with tenure and more
years of service. 39 On its face, such a protection appears to protect senior
teachers from being terminated in favor of less-expensive probationary
teachers. 40 Further, last-in, first-out policies are also attractive for their
seemingly objective approach to employment decisions. 41 However,
such decisions are arbitrary and may result in effective teachers being
89 (2016).
31. E.g. Elizabeth Powell, The Quest for Teacher Quality: Early Lessons from Race to the
Top and State Legislative Efforts Regarding Teacher Evaluations, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1061, 107475 (2013).
32. Black, supra note 30, at 89-90.
33. Id. at 90.
34. Powell, supra note 31, at 1069 (stating that administrators believed that teacher
effectiveness was based on observable traits like having “an open mind, a positive attitude, patience,
dedication, flexibility, and high expectations for her students.”).
35. Carole A. Veir & David L. Dagley, Legal Issues in Teacher Evaluation Legislation: A
Study of State Statutory Provisions, 2002 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 7 (2002).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Julie Rowland, Vergara and the complexities of teacher employment policies, EDUC.
COMM’N OF THE STATES, May 2015.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 4.
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dismissed due only to their inexperience rather than their inefficiency.
2. Probationary Periods Before a Teacher is Awarded Tenure
While achieving tenure status may seem easy or “automatic,”42 in
reality, teachers must meet certain requirements before attaining tenure
status, namely they must withstand multiple evaluations throughout a
designated probationary period. 43 During this probationary period, which
generally lasts two or three years, the probationary teacher will likely be
subject to repeated observation and evaluation.44 Moreover, during
probationary years, a school district can choose not to renew a teacher
without the protections of tenure safeguards. 45 It is only after that
probationary period, during which the school district determines that the
teacher is effective, that the teacher gains the security that comes with
tenure status. 46 The school district generally has pretty significant liberty
to make the decisions regarding whether or not to grant a teacher tenure,
provided the decisions are not discriminatory in nature. 47
Due to the importance of the probationary period in determining
whether a teacher will be awarded permanent employment through
tenure, the length of probationary periods has been the subject of debate
since decades before the most recent wave of legislative changes. 48 The
danger of a tenure track that is too short is two-fold: 1) the system
“confuses competence with compliance” and 2) the system requires
administrators “to make snap judgments” regarding a teacher’s
qualification for tenure. 49 When the probationary period is too short,
teachers are inclined to do whatever they determine necessary to achieve
tenure status, rather than whatever is necessary to ensure that their

42. Edwin C. Darden, Firing a teacher is getting easier, KAPPAN MAGAZINE, Dec.-Jan.
2013, at 68-9.
43. Kathy Christie & Jennifer Dounay Zinth, Updated, Teacher Tenure or Continuing
Contract Laws, EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, 1 (Aug. 2011)
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/94/93/9493.pdf.
44. Molly Robertson, Blaming Teacher Tenure is not the Answer, 44 J.L. & EDUC., 463, 468
(2015).
45. Christie, supra note 43.
46. Robertson, supra note 44.
47. Christie, supra note 43; 2-6 EDUCATION LAW § 6.06, Faculty and Staff Tenure,
LexisNexis (2015) (courts “permit educational institutions ‘maximum flexibility in dealing with
probationary’ employees.”).
48. See generally Ione L. Perry, Suppose We Lost Tenure?, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 183
(1977).
49. Paul S. Sutton, Thinking Anew About Teacher Tenure, EDUCATION WEEK, Dec. 15, 2009,
at 20-21.
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students are mastering classroom material. 50
Further, with increased testing and available data, a longer
probationary period would allow more time to gather evidence related to
a probationary teacher’s classroom effectiveness, which in turn would
result in better-informed employment decisions on the part of the
superintendents and boards of education. 51 As it stands, probationary
periods are arguably too short. The inevitable questions when
probationary periods are too short are: If during a two-year probationary
period a teacher’s students produce one year of excellent test results and
one year of “miserable” test results, then how does the school board
gauge the teacher’s effectiveness in the classroom? 52 Might the board
extend the evaluation period for a third year to “break the tie” so to
speak? 53 These are the questions that critics of extended probationary
periods must address.
Since its first publication in 2007, the National Conference on
Teacher Quality (NCTQ) has continually urged states to extend the
probationary period that teachers must complete before achieving
tenure. 54 The NCTQ suggests a baseline of five years. 55 However, the
2007 NCTQ findings showed that many states fell below that number, as
only two states required that teachers have completed five years of
service before they could achieve tenure: Indiana and Missouri.56
Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, and North Carolina fell slightly below
the NCTQ-prescribed standard, requiring four years of service before
achieving tenure, and most states, as of 2007, granted tenure after three
years of service. 57 More notably, California, Maine, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nevada, Vermont, and Washington offered tenure after only
two years, and North Dakota offered tenure after only one year of
service. 58
In 2008, Kentucky increased its probation period to four years,

50.
51.

See id.
Marc F. Bernstein, Is Tenure an Anachronism?, EDUCATION WEEK, March 21, 2006, at

34.
52.
53.

Id.
Stephen Sawchuk, California Turns Down District’s Bid to Lengthen Pre-Tenure Period,
EDUCATION WEEK BLOG (May 9, 2014) http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/
2014/05/california_turns_down_district.html.
54. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2007 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 6
(2008).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 97.
58. Id.
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bringing it closer to the NCTQ’s baseline suggestion. 59 Following that,
in 2009, Ohio increased its probationary period to seven years,
exceeding the five-year suggestion. 60
Also, in 2008, the NCTQ Yearbook Summary advised states that, to
enhance the effectiveness of their teachers, the legislatures should
implement policies and procedures for identifying and retaining effective
teachers. 61 In gauging the states’ compliance with this objective, the
NCTQ determined that “tenure occur[ed] virtually automatically in just
about all states, with little deliberation or consideration of evidence of
teacher performance. 62 While the NCTQ suggested that teacher
effectiveness and performance be considered in awarding tenure in
addition to a probationary period, it found that, as of the 2008
investigation, only Iowa and New Mexico schools required any evidence
of teacher effectiveness in awarding tenure status.63
B. The Pendulum of Teacher Tenure Reform from 1990-2010
Tenure was first implemented in New Jersey in 1909. 64 However,
while tenure may have been beneficial—and even necessary—at the
time, the threats to job security that plagued teachers almost one hundred
years ago are no longer as prevalent. At the turn of the 21st century,
tenure arguably provides too much protection to teachers. A 2007-2008
school year report showed that the number of tenured teachers actually
removed through the processes inherent in in teacher tenure laws was
only 2.1 percent. 65 Recognizing that the need for tenure may have
become obsolete towards the end of the twentieth century, some scholars
and politicians called for reform of state teacher tenure policies.
1. No Child Left Behind
This first wave of reform followed the implementation of President

59. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2008 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 71
(2009).
60. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2009 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 175
(2010).
61. National Council on Teacher Quality, supra note 59, at 3.
62. Id. at 69.
63. Id. at 70; Additionally, the New York City Department of Education initiated a process of
granting tenure by which principals worked with teachers and evaluated teacher performance,
granting tenure to only those teachers that have a “significant professional skill.” Id.
64. Patrick McGuinn, Ringing the Bell for K-12 Teacher Tenure Reform, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, 4 (2010).
65. Id.
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George W. Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001. 66 When
passed, the bill was seen as one of the most widespread education
reforms implemented since the 1960s.67 Among other education
initiatives, this act required that only “highly qualified” teachers lead
classrooms. 68 Highly qualified teachers were teachers who proved that
they had knowledge of their subject matters, had bachelor’s degrees, and
were certified by the states in which they were employed. 69
However, this initiative was criticized for its over-emphasis on
certification rather than teacher effectiveness. 70 Therefore, in the decade
that followed enactment of NCLB, the policy priority shifted from
desiring highly-qualified teachers to desiring highly-effective teachers. 71
2. Race to the Top
President
Barack
Obama’s
administration
subsequently
implemented Race to the Top, which embodied the desire to hire and
retain effective rather than qualified teachers and marked “a historic
moment in American education.” 72 The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 set aside $100 billion for education funding. 73
Of that amount, $4.35 billion fueled the interstate competition for federal
education funding known as the Race to the Top (RTTT) program. 74 The
program’s design and implementation—as well as the distribution of
funds—were largely the work of the United States Department of
Education (DOE) and were divided into three separate phases. 75 During
Phases 1 and 2, the DOE required states to submit an application
describing how their state compared with the RTTT goals and their
66. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
67. The New Rules: An overview of the testing and accountability provisions of the No Child
FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
Left
Behind
Act,
PBS
schools/nochild/nclb.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
68. Robert Gordon, Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Identifying Effective Teachers
Using Performance on the Job, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 5 (2006).
69. Id.; U.S. Department of Education, Facts and Terms Every Parent Should Know About
NCLB (last modified Feb. 2, 2009) http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/parents/
parentfacts.html.
70. Gordon, supra note 68, at 7.
71. Marc F. Bernstein, Is Tenure an Anachronism?, EDUCATION WEEK, March 21, 2006, at
34.
72. President Barack Obama, Race to the Top, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/
k-12/race-to-the-top (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
73. William G. Howell, Results of President Obama’s Race to the Top, EDUCATION NEXT,
Fall 2015, at 60.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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state’s future plans to comply with RTTT goals.76 Then, in Spring 2011,
a third phase of the competition, limited to only “losing finalists from
Phase 2,” began. 77 Ultimately, “[a] significantly higher percentage of
participating states won in Phase 3, although amounts of these grants
were considerably smaller than those from Phases 1 and 2.” 78
Essentially, RTTT was a grant program, offering monetary
incentives—funding—to states that were “willing to spur systemic
reform to improve teaching and learning in America’s schools.” 79 The
express purpose of the RTTT Fund was to encourage, through an offer
of competitive grants, state legislatures and policymakers to change the
educational environment in their state by improving student performance
and achievement, increasing graduation rates, and promoting preparation
for college. 80 The initiative lists four areas in which the government
sought to promote education reform in the states: a) the implementation
of international standards and assessments with the goal of preparing
students to successfully enter the workplace or a college classroom; b)
the establishment of data systems to measure performance and provide
meaningful statistics to inform teachers and administrators where and
how they can improve; c) an increase in effective teachers and principals
(as well as improved equity in the distribution of those effective
educators) and d) the boosting of low-achieving school districts. 81
Though RTTT participation was ultimately voluntary and states had
to apply for a chance to receive funding, states rushed to enact education
reform so as to comply with RTTT and secure federal funding for their
states. 82 In the end, “40 states and the District of Columbia submitted
applications to Phase 1 of the competition” in March 2010, and “[35]
states and the District of Columbia submitted applications to Phase 2 of
the competition in June 2010.” 83 Only four states chose not to apply. 84

76. Id.
77. Id. at 61.
78. Id.
79. President Barack Obama, Race to the Top, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/
education/k-12/race-to-the-top (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
80. Race to the Top Fund, 34 Fed. Reg. 74,221 (Nov. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pt. 75).
81. Id.
82. Associated Press, States Change Laws in Hopes of Race to the Top Edge, EDUCATION
WEEK, Jan. 20, 2010, at 19.
83. William G. Howell, Results of President Obama’s Race to the Top, EDUCATION NEXT,
Fall 2015, at 61.
84. Id. at 64. However, even in those states, legislators felt that RTTT had an effect on
policymaking decisions in their states. Id. at 65. Overall, “one-third of legislators” said that RTTT
had a “massive or “big” impact on their states’ education policy reforms, and only 19 percent said
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The result of education reform within the last 15 years—
particularly with NCLB and also with RTTT—has been a wide-spread
increase in standardized testing with the objective of measuring student
success and college-readiness, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness
of the teacher’s responsible for their results. 85
III. STATE LEGISLATURES’ RESPONSE TO RACE TO THE TOP—LINKING
TEACHER EVALUATIONS AND TEACHER EMPLOYMENT
Although the last twenty years have seen federally-led movements
in education such as those mentioned in the previous section, the
decision to reform education policy is ultimately up to the individual
state legislatures. However, motivated by the federal funding available
through RTTT, state legislatures responded to the RTTT’s concerns for
gauging and improving teacher effectiveness by reforming their
education statutes. 86 In fact, between 2010 and 2015, 38 states plus the
District of Columbia modified their education laws. 87 The central theme
of these reforms was creating a link between student performance and
the evaluation of teacher effectiveness. 88
A. Push Toward a Link Between Objective Data and Employment
Decisions
In response to RTTT’s commitment to addressing the performance
of American students and the causes of students’ performances,
participating states made evaluating and encouraging teacher
effectiveness a legislative priority. For example, in 2011, Indiana
replaced a teacher tenure statute that had been in effect for over 80

that their states were not impacted at all by the RTTT competition. Id.
85. See, e.g., Diane Ravitch, Marc Tucker: The U.S. DOE’s “Mea Culpa” Did Not Go Far
Enough, Diane Ravitch’s Blog: A site to discuss better education for all (Oct. 27, 2015)
http://dianeravitch.net/category/race-to-the-top/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (discussing a Council of
the Great City Schools report which discovered that, “on average, more than 122 standardized tests
between pre-K and grade 12” are taken per year, with each student taking close to eight tests
individually per year as a result of the federal requirements of No Child Left Behind and Race to the
Top in addition to state and local policies).
86. News Desk, Teacher tenure rules are in state of flux across the nation, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Nov. 29, 2014) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/teacher-tenure-rules-state-flux/.
87. Regina Umpstead, Ann E. Blankenship & Linda Weiss, The New State of Teacher
Evaluation and Employment Laws: An Analysis of Legal Actions and Trends, 322 ED. LAW. REP.
577, 581 (Dec. 3, 2015).
88. Bruce Baker, Joseph O. Oliwole & Preston C. Green, The Legal Consequences of
Mandating High Stakes Decisions Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the
Race-to-the-Top Era, EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jan. 28, 2013, at 3.
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years 89 with a system based on teacher evaluations 90 because the state
had suffered a trend of low graduation rates, high drop-out rates, and
“static” performance on national tests in the preceding years. 91 In light
of studies, which the State Legislature perceived to indicate a
relationship between teacher effectiveness and student performance, the
Legislature determined that the best course of action was to “exercise its
police power to ensure that the education of its citizens was based upon
teacher effectiveness and student achievement and not seniority.” 92
Similarly, many states throughout the country sought to link student
performances and objective data with determinations of teacher
effectiveness, and ultimately, tenure decisions in response to DOE
directives. 93
In general, implementation of objective measures of teacher
effectiveness took form as either value-added models or student-growth
percentile evaluations. 94 Value-added models use assessment data to
estimate the extent to which the difference in a student’s test scores from
the beginning of the year to the end of the year can be attributed to a
specific teacher or the school in which he was educated.95 The goal of
value-added models is to determine what effect a teacher has on a
student’s test scores. 96 Under the Tennessee model, for example, the
evaluations use students’ test scores from previous tests to predict the
success that the student will have on the next test. 97 The difference
between the predicted score and the actual score constitutes the teacher’s
effect on the students—whether positive or negative. 98
Student growth percentile evaluations, on the other hand, act as “a
descriptive measure of the relative change of a student’s performance

89. Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Schs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30309, *3-5
(S.D. Ind. March 12, 2015). The initial law was enacted in 1927 to “secure permanency in the
teaching force.” Id. at *3 (citing Watson v. Burnett, 216 Ind. 216, 222 (1939)).
90. Id. at *6; See also IND. CODE ANN. § 20-28-7.5-1(d) (West 2011).
91. Elliot, 2015 U.S Dist. LEXIS 30309 at *24.
92. Id. at *23-24 (citing the briefs for the Board and the State).
93. Regina Umpstead, Ann E. Blankenship & Linda Weiss, The New State of Teacher
Evaluation and Employment Laws: An Analysis of Legal Actions and Trends, 322 ED. LAW REP.
577, 578 (2015); Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CAL. L.
REV. 75, 92 (2016).
94. Black, supra note 93, at 89.
95. Bruce Baker, Joseph O. Oliwole & Preston C. Green, The Legal Consequences of
Mandating High Stakes Decisions Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the
Race-to-the-Top Era, EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jan. 28, 2013, at 7.
96. Id.
97. See generally Wagner v. Haslam, 112 F.Supp.3d 673 (M.D. Tenn., June 12, 2015).
98. Baker, supra note 95, at 8.
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compared to that of all students.” 99 These measures compare an
individual student’s growth based on yearly test scores against the
performances of students in other classrooms. 100
Each type of evaluation is prevalent in teacher tenure laws and is
used to assess the effectiveness of a teacher in order to determine either
the teacher’s eligibility for tenure status or his eligibility for dismissal.
B. Legislative Changes in Response to Concerns Related to Effectiveness
Due to the concerns that teacher effectiveness contributes to the
success of a school district, the states have generally reformed their
tenure laws to accomplish one or more of the following ends: 1)
allowing districts to terminate a teacher’s employment based on the
evaluations, 2) making it more difficult for teachers to attain tenure, and
3) eliminating seniority as a factor in determining which teachers should
be terminated during times when the district must downsize its staff.
1. Making it Easier to Dismiss Ineffective Teachers
In 2010, the NCTQ Yearbook reported that, although almost every
state’s tenure laws provided grounds for dismissal, those laws were
ineffective for dismissing under-performing teachers in practice because
they were limited to either criminal behavior or issues of morality or
they were too ambiguous in defining terms such as “incompetency” or
“inadequacy.” 101 However, with new legislation, Oklahoma and Rhode
Island led the states in enacting grounds and procedures for dismissing
ineffective teachers. 102
In 2010, New York enacted a law that, although tenured teachers
could only be removed for just cause, “a pattern of ineffective teaching
or performance” would constitute incompetence and would support the
removal of tenured teachers. 103 By 2011, 17 states had modified their
laws, providing for dismissal of teachers with unsatisfactory
evaluations. 104 As of 2015, 28 states had added ineffectiveness as a

99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.; Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CAL. L. REV.
75, 94 (2016).
101. National Center on Teacher Quality, 2010 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 12
(2011).
102. Id.
103. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3020 (McKinney 2015).
104. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2011 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 117
(2012).
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cause for the dismissal of teachers. 105
Each state determines for itself and varies in the way that it utilizes
findings of ineffectiveness—some calling for mandatory dismissal, and
others for discretionary dismissal. 106 For example, Alaska, 107
Delaware 108, Connecticut, 109 Florida, 110 Georgia, 111 Indiana, 112 New
Mexico, 113 New York, 114 Oklahoma, 115 West Virginia, 116 and
Wyoming 117 modified laws to allow school districts to exercise
discretion in determining whether an “ineffective” teacher may be
terminated. In the alternative, Arkansas, 118 Colorado, 119 Michigan, 120 and
North Carolina 121 modifications required public schools to terminate or
dismiss “ineffective” teachers.
2. Making it More Difficult for Teachers to Achieve Tenure
Additionally, the new legislation responding to the RTTT initiative
sought to make it more difficult for teachers to attain tenure. One way
that legislatures have achieved this goal is by basing the final award of
tenure on evaluations throughout the probation period. In 2009, when
NCTQ began investigating the interplay of teacher effectiveness in
teacher tenure decisions, none of the states utilized the teacher
performance data in decisions of teacher tenure.122 Then, by 2013, the
105. Kathryn M. Doherty & Sandi Jacobs, State of the States 2015: Evaluating Teaching,
Leading, and Learning, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, Nov. 2015, at 28.
106. Bruce D. Baker, Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, The Legal Consequences of
Mandating High Stakes Decisions Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the
Race-to-the-Top Era, EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jan. 28, 2013, at 4.
107. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.149(E) (2016).
108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1273 (2014).
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-151(D) (2015).
110. FLA. STAT. § 1012.335(5) (2011).
111. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-942(B) (2015).
112. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-28-7.5-1(B)(3)(B) (LexisNexis 2015).
113. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-19E (West 2010).
114. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3020-B(2)(A) (McKinney 2015).
115. OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 101.22(A)(2),(4), and (6) (2014) (teachers may be dismissed in
certain circumstances, but must be dismissed in others).
116. W. VA. CODE § 18A-3C-2(H) (2012).
117. WYO. STAT. § 21-7-110 (A)(VII) (2015).
118. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-2807(G)(1)&(2)(A) (West 2015) (stating that upon accepting a
subpar evaluation result, a superintendent “shall recommend termination or nonrenewal of the
teacher’s contract.”).
119. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-87(5.01) (2012).
120. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1249(d) (West 2016).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-325(e)(3) (West 2015).
122. Kathryn M. Doherty & Sandi Jacobs, State of the States 2015: Evaluating Teaching,
Leading, and Learning, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, Nov. 2015, at iii.
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NCTQ reported that 20 states had implemented measures by which
student performance was factored into decisions regarding awards of
tenure status. 123 That number had grown to 23 by 2015. 124 125
The other way that states made it more difficult to achieve tenure
was by extending the probationary period that a teacher has to complete
before obtaining the protections of tenure. Many states also increased the
amount of time that a teacher served as a probationary period. As of
2011, only Mississippi granted tenure after one year and California,
Hawaii, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Vermont offered tenure after
two years. 126
3. Eliminating Seniority as a Factor for School Districts to
Consider When Downsizing
Finally, a more modest trend of modification to education policies
is the elimination of seniority as a factor in determining who is retained
and who is terminated in circumstances which required school districts
to cut teachers. 127 A 2011 modification to Illinois’s teacher tenure laws
sought to eliminate consideration of seniority by providing that length of
continued service must not be considered as a factor in terminating
employment unless all other factors are equal. 128 Similarly, Michigan’s
Teacher Tenure Act contains a provision that the “length of service or
tenure status shall not be a factor in a personnel decision” unless there
are two equally-qualified candidates, where tenure status or seniority
may be considered a “tiebreaker.” 129 As of 2014, ten states prohibited
123. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2013 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 10
(2014).
124. Doherty, supra note 122.
125. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.150 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-538.01(D)
(2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-203(2)(a) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-151(d)
(2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 1403(a)(2) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 1012.335(2)(C)(3) (2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1249(d) (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.81(Sec. 1) (West
2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.3197(3) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-5(b) (West
2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012(2)(b) (McKinney 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-325(e)(3)
(West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 101.3 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-205.1(IV) (2016);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-503(4) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(A) (West 2013); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §21-7-102 (ii) (West 2016).
126. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2011 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 76
(2012).
127. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §14.20.170 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §22-63-202(3)
(West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-948 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1248 (West
2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-325(2)(a)(2) (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3319.17(C) (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-511(b) (West 2014).
128. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 24-12 (West 2015).
129. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1248(a) (West 2011).
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using seniority status as a factor in reduction-in-force employment
decisions. 130
IV. EVALUATING THE MODIFICATION AND THE OPTIONS THAT STATES
HAVE GOING FORWARD
A. Eliminating Tenure Completely is an Impractical Option
In response to RTTT and the criticisms of teacher tenure, the first,
and most dramatic, option for state legislatures was to eliminate tenure
altogether and contract with teachers only on a year-to-year basis. 131 One
argument against implementing any form of tenure is that it directly
conflicts with the importance that American society places on
education. 132 For example, in an article in The New Republic, Michael
Glenwood criticized tenure as illogical and an impediment “to
improving the quality of education in our country.” 133 Instead,
Glenwood would like to see prominent politicians and policymakers
push to end tenure practices nationwide. 134
However, this option is ultimately unrealistic and in states where
legislatures have attempted such a feat, the laws were met by resistance.
Though elimination of teacher tenure has been proposed in a number of
states, such bills do not always make it past the floor in state senates or
houses of representatives. 135
Even when those bills do leave the floor and are presented to the
130. Julie Rowland, Vergara and the complexities of teacher employment policies, EDUC.
COMM’N OF THE STATES, May 2015, at 1, 5.
131. See The Florida Senate, Committee on Education Pre-K – 12: 2011 Summary of
Legislation Passed 4 (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) http://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/
Session/2011/BillSummary/CombinedPDF/ed.pdf (explaining that “the bill furthers the goals of
Race to the Top by basing employment decisions on the evaluation of instructional personnel” by
eliminating tenure).
132. Michael Glenwood, Making the Grade, 243 THE NEW REPUBLIC: A JOURNAL OF
POLITICS AND THE ARTS 920 (April 5, 2012).
133. Id.
134. Id. The article, overtly aligning with the Democratic political party, explicitly calls
“prominent Democrats, especially President Obama” to encourage the dissolution of teacher tenure
laws.
135. See Virginia Young, Missouri Senate sidelines bill abolishing teacher tenure, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, (April 03, 2012) http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missourisenate-sidelines-bill-abolishing-teacher-tenure/article_6d8296fc-7de9-11e1-8393001a4bcf6878.html (reporting that the Missouri Senate rejected a bill to eliminate teacher tenure,
and instead voted “to set up a task force to study teacher salaries and effectiveness.”); Emma
Brown, Virginia teacher tenure bill dies in GOP-led Senate, THE WASHINGTON POST, (March 8,
2012) https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-schools-insider/post/virginia-teacher-tenurebill-dies-in-gop-led-senate/2012/03/08/gIQAFjgXzR_blog.html.
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public for a vote, they are often rejected by the electorate. For example,
in 2011, the Idaho legislature sought to amend its education policies
related to issuance and renewal of contracts. 136 The amendment provided
that “no new employment contract between a school district and a
certificated employee shall result in the vesting of tenure, continued
expectation of employment or property rights in an employment
relationship.” 137 Additionally, it provided that when a school district
makes a reduction in its force, the school board must not consider
seniority or tenure as factors in making termination decisions. 138 Thus,
decisions in those circumstances were to be made based on the teachers’
performances rather than their date of hiring. 139
Throughout the legislative process, the 2011 Amendment was
known as “part of Idaho’s Students Come First legislation.” 140 The
stated purpose of the bill was to give “locally elected school boards” the
power to make decisions in their district and to “create a more
professional and accountable work force” by “phasing out tenure,”
incorporating parent feedback and student performance into the teacher
evaluations, and “eliminating seniority as a factor in reduction in force
decisions.” 141 Proponents of the “Students Come First” laws claimed
that the changes spurred “great benefits” in Idaho’s education system by
improving negotiations in local school districts and encouraging teachers
to find new ways to “engage 21st century learners, repurposing the
money raised for education to better serve students. 142
However, the bill was called “mean-spirited” and was alleged to
have “turn[ed] teachers into powerless pawns of the political system.” 143
The public ultimately rejected the bill, voting it down in a November
2012 general election by a margin of 57.29 percent (371,228 voters)
“No” to 42.71 percent (276,715 voters) “Yes.” 144

136.
137.
138.
139.

See IDAHO CODE § 33-515 (2016) (compiler’s note); 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 208.
See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 214.
Id. at 220.
Idaho Secretary of State, Proposition 1, Argument IN FAVOR of Proposition One, 2012
GENERAL
ELECTION
REFERENDA
BALLOT
QUESTIONS,
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/
elect/inits/2012/Prop1_statements.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
140. Idaho
Legislature,
Statement
of
Purpose
/
Fiscal
Note
RS20413,
https://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2011/S1108SOP.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
141. Id.
142. Idaho Secretary of State, supra note 136.
143. Id. (quoting Twin Falls Republican Rep. Leon Smith’s statement in a debate regarding
Proposition 1).
144. Election Center, 2012 Idaho General Election Proposition 1, Proposition 1: Teacher
Contracts, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, (last updated Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.spokesman.com/
elections/2012/idaho-general-election-2012/measures/statewide/idaho/76/.
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Further, eliminating tenure altogether is impractical because doing
so may violate the Contracts Clause of the both state constitutions and
the United States Constitution. 145 Because eliminating tenure effectively
eliminates teachers’ rights to employment contracts that are guaranteed
by the constitutions of both the United States and the individual states,
such measures are unconstitutional. 146 Courts tend to defer to the state
legislatures on state policy issues such as teacher tenure as the states are
better-equipped to determine the benefits, costs, and consequences of
different teacher tenure systems. 147 However, students and teachers have
called upon the courts to challenge the constitutionality of these states’
modified teacher tenure laws. 148
In order to bring an action on a claim that the teacher tenure law
violates the Contracts Clause, one must prove that a contractual right
existed between the parties, that the new law “impaired” the contractual
relationship between the parties, and that the law was not “reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public interest.”149 These challenges
are particularly likely where the law has eliminated rather than modified
a prior right to continued employment.
In order to assert a claim that a law is unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violates the Contracts Clause, the challenging party must
first prove that a contractual obligation exists. In general, where teachers
are entitled to the benefits of teacher tenure laws, there is a contractual
145. See generally Case Comment, Constitutional Law - Contract Clause - North Carolina
Superior Court Holds That Law Eliminating Teacher Tenure Violates Tenured Teachers’
Constitutionally Protected Contractual Rights, 128 HARV. L. REV. 995 (2015) [hereinafter
Constitutional Law - Contract Clause] (discussing the North Carolina decision and the Contract
Clause at length); Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Schs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30309 (S.D. Ind. March 12, 2015); N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 776 S.E.2d at *9 (N.C. App.
2015) modified and aff’d by 786 S.E.2d 255 (2016) (“hold[ing] the repeal is unconstitutional in its
retroactive application based on the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides that: “No State shall pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” See also, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, §
10 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contract shall be
enacted”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 16 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall ever be passed”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“No bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 24
(“No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed”).
147. See Al Baker, Lawsuit Challenges New York’s Teacher Tenure Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July
3, 2014), http://nyti.ms/VjSbXY (quoting education lawyer and professor at Columbia University’s
Teachers College Michael A. Rebell).
148. Edwin C. Darden, Firing a teacher is getting easier, KAPPAN MAG., Dec.-Jan. 2013.
149. See generally, e.g., Constitutional Law - Contract Clause, supra note 145; Elliott v. Bd.
Of Sch. Trs. Of Madison Consol. Schs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30309 (S.D. Ind. March 12, 2015);
N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 776 S.E.2d at *9 (N.C. App. 2015), modified and aff’d by 786
S.E.2d 255 (2016).
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relationship between the state and the teacher.150 Though it is not in the
nature of the legislatures’ duties to create contracts, it is within their
power to legislatively create them in the course of creating state
policy. 151 Thus, where the state enacts legislation that makes a promise
to an individual contingent on performance of an action—such as the
promise of employment in exchange for serving a probationary period
and being renewed as a permanent teacher—that promise creates a
vested contractual interest in the individual who performs the required
act. 152
Perhaps the easiest element to prove, when teacher tenure cases
come before the court challenging a law based on the contracts clause, is
that of impairment. 153 However, in teacher tenure cases where the
impairment is generally that, but for the legislative change, the teacher
would have been entitled to renewal of a contract (in other words,
continued employment) 154 or a hearing on the school board’s reasons for
termination, 155 the impairment is most likely substantial enough to
support the claim.
The third element in proving a claim of a violation of the contract
clause—that the law impairing a contractual relationship was a
reasonable and necessary step in promoting a public interest—requires a
two-step analysis. 156 The first question is whether there is a harm or a
purpose that the state is trying to address. 157 In general, if the goal of
these legislative reforms is to raise the level of performance of students
and teachers in the states, it seems like there is a legitimate public
interest being served. For example, in a case before the Southern District
of Indiana, the Court considered this issue and reasoned that the Indiana
General Assembly had a constitutional duty to “provide an education to
the citizens of the state,” 158 and thus, where the General Assembly had a
reasonable concern regarding the effects of teachers on low graduation
rates and test scores, improving teacher quality was a legitimate public
150. Indiana ex. rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938); see also Constitutional Law
- Contract Clause, supra note 145.
151. Id.
152. See N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 776 S.E.2d at *12.
153. Elliott, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30309 at *18 (stating that “There is no doubt that SB 1’s
RIF provision, as Mr. Elliott notes, ‘is plainly the source of [the] impairment of Elliott’s contractual
rights.’”); N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 776 S.E.2d at *13 (stating with regard to the impairment issue,
“This is not a difficult question.”).
154. Elliott, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30309 at *21; N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 776 S.E.2d at *13.
155. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 776 S.E.2d at *13.
156. Id. at *14.
157. Id.
158. Elliott, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30309 at *22.
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purpose. 159
The second step in the analysis is determining whether a law is
reasonable and necessary, or whether there is another “less drastic” way
in which the state could promote, protect, or achieve its legitimate
purpose. 160 For example, when confronted with the question of whether
the North Carolina State Legislature was able to accomplish its
education objectives without completely eliminating tenure, the
appellate court reasoned that the state’s strategy was not a reasonable
and necessary means of effecting their legitimate state purpose because
there were other means by which the same interest could have been
accomplished. 161 The court said that the State could have accomplished
the same goals using well-defined “teacher performance evaluation
standards, teacher performance ratings, and teacher status, thus creating
greater consistency in the determination of career status and the
revocation of career status based on evaluations” 162
In light of these challenges, completely eliminating tenure is not a
viable option for legislatures in future modifications to teacher tenure.
B. Use of Performance Evaluation Methods Present both Practical and
Constitutional Problems
The use of teacher evaluations in the classroom to assess teachers’
effectiveness and competence is not a novel or revolutionary idea.163
What is noteworthy about the continued discussion regarding teacher
159. Id. at 27.
160. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 776 S.E.2d at *16.
161. Id.
162. Id. It is important to note here that the two cases, which have been examined in this
section, address very different statutes, and thus, while their analyses address the same ideas, they
differ. In North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, the North Carolina modification eliminated tenure
completely, thus the idea that teacher evaluations were a “less drastic” way to ensure employment
of quality teachers and the idea that the previous law allowed for termination of incompetent
teachers showed that there was no legitimate purpose in eliminating tenure. On the contrary, in
Elliott, the challenged law simply eliminated tenure as a factor in reduced force termination
determinations. Accordingly, the fact that school boards could fire ineffective tenured teachers did
not come into the analysis of whether there was a legitimate public interest because that power
existed in a different set of circumstances.
163. Ione L. Perry, Suppose We Lost Tenure?, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 183, 185 (Dec.
1977) (stating that tenure is linked to assessing teacher quality, and therefore, “necessitates
evaluation.”); Frank Gray & Margaret L. Burns, Does “Management by Objectives” Work in
Education?, EDUCATION LEADERSHIP 414, 415-416 (March 1979) (discussing the prospects for
school districts that utilize an objective-based system to evaluate management and teacher
achievement); Joan L. Buttram & Bruce L. Wilson, Promising Trends in Teacher Evaluation,
EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 4, 5 (April 1987) (recognizing the need to reform the uses of annual
evaluations).
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performance evaluations is the states’ apparent inability to effectively
implement or appropriately utilize methods of evaluating their teachers
even after almost 40 years of debate on the topic. 164 As far back as the
1970s, evaluations of teachers were conducted at the discretion of local
school district leaders, 165 and generally provided that the evaluation
processes afforded due process and were executed in accordance with
the proscribed policy. 166 Courts generally upheld these evaluation
procedures. 167 Evaluations became a topic of national discussion after
publication of A Nation at Risk, a federal paper suggesting use of
evaluations “as a potential school-reform strategy.” 168
However, implementing evaluation policies and procedures is
exponentially more complicated now than it was in the early 1970s or
1980s. 169 Today, the discussion of teacher evaluations is complicated by
availability of student performance data, the complex formulas and
instruments whose validity depends on differing expert testimonies, and
vendors who advertise the un-matched benefits of their particular
method of evaluation. 170 In the wake of 21st century education
movements—namely NCLB and RTTT—the use of performance-based
evaluations in determining teacher effectiveness has taken center stage,
and the debate continues over the appropriate methods of evaluating
teachers and the appropriate use of the collected data. 171
Unfortunately, though the methods utilizing student-performance
data as an indicator of teacher effectiveness seem to be a facially
objective way to make employment decisions,172 such methods are not
without their problems.

164. As this section will illustrate, there are no concrete answers to the questions: “What types
of evaluations have the most benefit in evaluating teachers’ effectiveness?” and “How should the
evaluations be utilized so as to ensure that school districts are identifying, retaining, and molding
the most effective teachers?”
165. Helen M. Hazi, Legal Challenges to Teacher Evaluations: Pitfalls and Possibilities in the
States, 87 THE CLEARING HOUSE 134, 134 (2014).
166. Id. at 135.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 134.
169. Id. at 137.
170. Id. at 137-138.
171. Id. at 134.
172. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CAL. L. REV. 75,
94 (2016).
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1. Using Performance-based Evaluations Poses Several Practical
Concerns
While it is necessary for states to implement some type of
measuring system to gauge teachers’ effectiveness in the classroom to
ensure that schools are identifying and retaining effective teachers and
dismissing ineffective teachers, it is unclear what the best method is for
accomplishing those goals. Scholars, administrators, and teachers often
debate the pros and cons of teacher evaluations and their place in
education.
One criticism of utilizing evaluations to gauge teacher effectiveness
is that it has led to too much testing. 173 Standardized testing, which was
ironically implemented to help objectively gauge student performance
and teacher effectiveness, has now become a burden on teachers by
requiring them to forfeit instructional time in order to prepare students
for testing. 174 An important—and perhaps the most well-known—
element of the NCLB Act was that it implemented a series of
standardized tests that students took each year between third and eighth
grade and “at least once in high school” in order to identify school
districts in need of improvement. 175 These tests presented several
problems: 1) the frequency of the testing 176 led states to opt for “easy
and inexpensive tests” that were not a true representation of the state of
the education system; 2) the pressure placed on schools to perform well
on tests led teachers to ignore students that were likely to do either really
poorly or really well in favor of attending to the borderline students to
ensure that they passed the tests; and 3) the priority placed on testing
reduced teachers’ instructional time. 177 Further, the increase in testing
seemed to have the most negative effects on minority communities and
173. Jamie McKenzie, Killing NCLB in 2007: 17 Reasons Why NCLB Must Go, 4 NO CHILD
LEFT 8 (Sept. 2006) http://nochildleft.com/2006/sept06killing.html.
174. Diane Ravitch, Obama Administration Admits There is Too Much Testing, DIANE
RAVITCH’S BLOG: A SITE TO DISCUSS BETTER EDUCATION FOR ALL (Oct. 24, 2015)
http://dianeravitch.net/category/race-to-the-top/. A recent survey revealed that test preparation in an
average eighth grade class is 20 to 25 hours—which amounts to 2.3 percent—of class time. Id.
(quoting a story in the Times).
175. U.S. Department of Education, No Child Left Behind: Facts and Terms Every Parent
Should Know About NCLB, http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/parents/parentfacts.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2016).
176. As a result of NCLB, RTTT, and other state and local testing, students take and average
of “more than 112 standardized tests between pre-K and grade 12.” Diane Ravitch, Marc Tucker:
The U.S. DOE’s “Mea Culpa” Did Not Go Far Enough, DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG: A SITE TO
DISCUSS BETTER EDUCATION FOR ALL (Oct. 27, 2015) http://dianeravitch.net/category/race-to-thetop/.
177. McKenzie, supra note 173.
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students. 178 This result directly conflicts with the policymakers’
intentions for implementing additional standardized tests. 179 Even the
masterminds behind the RTTT initiative are recognizing that the
resultant over-reliance on testing is not advantageous to children or
schools in general. 180 However, it remains to be seen how subsequent
education policy reforms will address this issue. 181
Unfortunately, the methods utilizing student-performance data as an
indicator of teacher effectiveness also have a reputation for being
unstable and unreliable from year to year. 182 A 2010 report conducted
for the United States Department of Education, Institute for Education
Sciences 183 “found that there is about a 25% chance (if using three years
of data) or a 35% chance (if using one year of data) that a teacher who is
‘average’ would be identified as ‘significantly worse than average’ and
potentially be fired” due to the lack of reliability of value-added
measures. 184 The study estimated that such inaccuracies might occur two
out of ten times within a year. 185 In states that set rigid standards for
evaluation results and connect those results to tenure and dismissal
decisions, the stakes of substandard teaching are high, but the likelihood
that the teacher’s results reliably illustrate the teacher’s standard of
teaching leaves a large margin for error.186 Further reliability issues
result from the inability of objective performance measures to account
for differences in student characteristics—such as family income,
homelessness, divorce, tutoring, disabilities, language, after-school
activities, and race—that might affect performance on standardized
178.

Diane Ravitch, BATs Respond to Arne’s Retreat on Testing, DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG: A
(Oct. 24, 2015) http://dianeravitch.net/category/raceto-the-top/.
179. Id.
180. Diane Ravitch, FairTest Reacts to Duncan Statement on Testing, DIANE RAVITCH’S
BLOG: A SITE TO DISCUSS BETTER EDUCATION FOR ALL (Oct. 24, 2015)
http://dianeravitch.net/category/race-to-the-top/ (claiming that the Obama Administration
recognizes the need to downsize the amount and frequency of testing and “admits that high-stakes
exams are out of control in U.S. public schools.”).
181. Diane Ravitch, Marc Tucker: The U.S. DOE’s “Mea Culpa” Did Not Go Far Enough,
DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG: A SITE TO DISCUSS BETTER EDUCATION FOR ALL (Oct. 27, 2015)
http://dianeravitch.net/category/race-to-the-top/.
182. Bruce D. Baker, Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, The Legal Consequences of
Mandating High Stakes Decisions Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the
Race-to-the-Top Era, EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jan. 28, 2013, at 9.
183. Baker, supra note 182, at 12 (see P.Z. Schochet & H.S. Chang, Error rates in measuring
teacher and school performance based on student test score gains, (2010)
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104004/pdf/20104004.pdf).
184. Baker, supra note 182, at 12.
185. Baker, supra note 182, at 12.
186. Baker, supra note 182, at 11.
SITE TO DISCUSS BETTER EDUCATION FOR ALL
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tests. 187 Accordingly, utilizing standardized test outcomes is a better
indicator of the effects of “student demographics” than a teacher’s
performance. 188
2. Using Value-added Models Poses Due Process Concerns
Judges have expressed another concern regarding the use of
evaluations in predicting and assessing teacher effectiveness and the
ultimate use of those determinations in dismissing teachers: due
process. 189 Tenured teachers arguably have the most at stake in terms of
the effects of performance evaluation method that the state elects to
use. 190 It is a widely-recognized legal principle that teacher tenure laws
create in the recipient a property interest in the benefits of tenure. 191
Therefore, it is a right that cannot be taken away unless the teacher is
given the benefits of an “adequate legal process.” 192 The concern that the
legislative modifications pose with regard to due process considerations
is that the evaluations that are used to determine continued employment
have the potential to be arbitrary in their application. 193
In order to pursue a claim on a due process violation, a party must
show that he has been deprived of an interest in life, liberty, or property
in a way that is arbitrary and capricious. 194 Because a tenured teacher
has a property interest in employment, he has to prove only that the
deprivation of that right was arbitrary and capricious and did not allow
an adequate legal process. Such claims could arise where there are
questions of reliability or error in the use of performance-based
evaluations. 195
For example, due process claims might arise where the employment
of certain teachers is based on the performance of students over which
the teachers had no control. 196 In 2011, Florida passed the “Student
187. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CAL. L. REV. 75,
97-98 (2016).
188. Id. at 98.
189. See, e.g., Cook v. Bennet, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
190. Helen M. Hazi, Legal Consequences to Teacher Evaluations: Pitfalls in the States, 87
THE CLEARING HOUSE 134, 134 (2014).
191. LaPointe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 173 So.3d 1152, 1158 (La. 2015).
192. Id.
193. Bruce D. Baker, Joseph O. Oluwole, & Preston C. Green, The Legal Consequences of
Mandating High Stakes Decisions on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the Race-tothe-Top Era, EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jan. 28, 2013, at 10.
194. Id. at 10-11.
195. Id. at 11-16.
196. See generally Cook v. Bennet, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015) (evaluating the
constitutionality of Florida’s evaluation policy that subjected teachers to evaluation based on the
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Success Act,” requiring that “[a]t least 50 percent of a performance
evaluation must be based upon data and indicators of student learning
growth assessed annually by statewide assessments.” 197 Accordingly, the
Florida Commissioner of Education implemented a two-part valueadded model of evaluation that determined a teacher’s effectiveness
based on: a) the students’ scores for English and mathematics on a state
standardized test (50 percent of the evaluation), and b) the score for the
school, which was based on factors contributing to the school’s
environment (the other 50 percent of the evaluation). 198 However, the
test for whether such a policy could withstand a due process challenge is
whether there is a rational basis for the policy. 199 Under such a review,
evaluation policies need only be “rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.” 200 Therefore, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
held that even where evaluations were based upon tests covering
subjects or assessing students that the teacher does not teach, the policy
should be upheld so long as the tests—or other method of evaluation—
are rationally related to the purpose of the improving student
performance by improving the state of public schools. 201
3. Peer-Review Evaluations are a Viable Alternative to ValueAdded Models
A more hands-on method of evaluating teacher performance that
acts as an alternative to the unreliable value-added models is
implementing a peer-review system by which teachers work closely with
other teachers to evaluate and guide those teachers through the teaching
process. 202 These Peer Assistance and Review (PAR) methods require
that teachers act as “peer reviewers,” leaving their capacity as instructors
in the classroom to serve for a number of years providing both

results of standardized testing even though they taught subjects that were not tested on the exam);
Wagner v. Haslam, No. 3:15–CV–115, 2015 WL 3658165, at *12 (M.D. Tenn., June 12, 2015)
(evaluating Policy 5.201, which uses state-wide value-added assessments to measure the
effectiveness of all teachers regardless of their subject matter).
197. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1) (West 2015).
198. Cook v. Bennet, 792 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015).
199. Id. at 1300 (citing Fresenius Med. Care Holdings v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 935, 945 (11th
Cir.2013)).
200. Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 314 n. 6 (1996)).
201. Id. at 1301 (holding that because the rationale for the policy was improving performance
by improving the quality of instruction, administration, and supervision, the policy applied to any
teacher in a school where the students were subject to state testing).
202. Susan Moore Johnson & Sarah E. Fiarman, The Potential of Peer Review, 70 TEACHER
EVALUATION: WHAT’S FAIR? WHAT’S EFFECTIVE?, Nov. 2012, 20-25.
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evaluative and assistive functions for an assigned group of 15 to 20
teachers. 203 The efforts of the peer reviewer are supervised by a PAR
panel made up of “union leaders and district administrators.” 204 Peer
reviewers submit their finds to the panel and answer a series of questions
in order to give the decision-making panel the most complete picture of
the reviewed teacher’s effectiveness.205
In order to serve as peer reviewers, teachers must have completed at
least five years of effective teaching and must pass a competitive
application process. 206 An obvious disadvantage of this system is that it
places a high-stakes decision upon the recommendations of one
person. 207 Additionally, teachers must pursue additional training and
learn to adapt to a large caseload to navigate the evaluation process.208
However, there are also several advantages. The major advantage is that
rather than supervisors, peer-teacher reviewers are able to provide
assistance that principals or other evaluators are unable to provide.209
Additionally, peer-review methods create smooth dismissal proceedings
because the PAR panel serves as a requisite administrative review
element, thus meeting the due process requirements.210 Ultimately, peer
reviewers allow for control over the profession of teaching to become
vested in teachers. 211
One example of a nationally recognized peer-evaluation system is
found in the Cincinnati Public School System. 212 The Cincinnati Public
School system and the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers developed a
Peer Assistance and Evaluation Program in an attempt to not only
evaluate its teachers, but also to improve the quality of their
classrooms. 213 The program utilizes consulting teachers who evaluate
and assist first-year teachers in the school district. 214 Additionally, where
a principal expresses concern for an experienced teacher’s performance,

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Rick DuFour & Mike Mattos, How Do Principals Really Improve Schools?, 70 THE
PRINCIPALSHIP, April 2013, 34-40.
210. Susan Moore Johnson & Sarah E. Fiarman, The Potential of Peer Review, 70 TEACHER
EVALUATION: WHAT’S FAIR? WHAT’S EFFECTIVE?, Nov. 2012, 20-25.
211. Id.
212. Cincinnati Public Schools, Teacher Evaluations, http://www.cps-k12.org/aboutcps/employment/tes (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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a panel composed of both teachers and administrators assigns a
consulting teacher to work with the teacher to improve the teacher’s
skills and performance. 215
C. Extended Probationary Periods
As discussed supra, Section II.B.2, several states have increased the
time that a teacher must serve before he is able to achieve tenure status.
The criticism regarding lengthy periods of probation are not rooted in
the judiciary. On the contrary, in California, where the Board of
Education has rejected such measures, the court in Vergara v. State
determined that the two year probationary period was insufficient, and
actually constituted a constitutional violation.216 The court found that
students and teachers were “unfairly, unnecessarily, and for no legally
cognizable reason (let alone a compelling one) disadvantaged by the
current Permanent Employment Statute” and accordingly found the
statute unconstitutional. 217
However, the view expressed in Vergara was unpopular, and the
court of appeals eventually reversed the decision.218 However, at the
time, much of the resistance to the lower court’s decision originated
from other legislators, teachers, boards of education, and ultimately,
teachers’ unions. 219 For example, even before the Vergara decision, in
California, the state with one of the shortest probationary periods—only
two years—the San Jose school district sought to increase its
probationary period from two to three years in furtherance of a new
evaluation method. 220 However, the California Board of Education,
“under heavy lobbying from the California Teachers Association—the
215. Id.
216. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 Cal. Super. LEXIS 176, at *13-14 (June 10, 2014)
(tentative opinion).
217. Id.
218. Vergara v. State, No. B258589, 2016 WL 4443590, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016);
AND
ACTION,
California
Teachers
Association,
Vergara
v.
State,
ISSUES
http://www.cta.org/en/Issues-and-Action/Ongoing-Issues/Vergara-Trial1 (last visited March 6,
2016). The parties began oral arguments on February 25, 2016.
219. See Students v. Teachers Unions, EDUCATION REPORTER (June 2014)
http://www.eagleforum.org/publications/educate/june14/students-v-teachers-unions.html; Anthony
Rebora, Both Sides Now, Terminating Tenure, and a Sickening Ploy, EDUCATION WEEK: TEACHER,
Aug. 5, 2005 (stating that proponents of the 2005 California initiative to increase probationary
periods from two to five years included principals and parents, while those opposed to the change
included affected teachers).
220. Stephen Sawchuk, California Turns Down District’s Bid to Lengthen Pre-Tenure Period,
EDUCATION WEEK BLOG (May 9, 2014) http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/
2014/05/california_turns_down_district.html.
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parent of the San Jose union affiliate—decided not to permit the
plan.” 221
While the NCTQ has continued to be a proponent of extended
probation periods (claiming that five years of probationary status is an
ideal number of years of service to require before awarding tenure),222
others find that longer periods of probationary status are “unnecessary”
and may serve as a deterrent to new teachers. 223 The two major ways in
which increased probationary periods might dissuade new teachers from
entering the profession are: 1) the fear that longer probation periods
lessen the chance of achieving tenure status, due to the number of factors
that might change over an increased period of time, and 2) the added
“perceived cost” in the form of stress from extended periods of
evaluation and the extra effort from a pursuit of tenure. 224 One of the
problems presented by extended probationary periods is the uncertainty
that new teachers face without the guarantees afforded by gaining
tenure. 225 Another concern is that increased probationary periods might
lead to a decreased level of engagement due to the implied attitude that
probationary teachers are “disposable.” 226
While the concern that increased probation periods acts as a
deterrent for new teachers entering the workforce, the concern can be
combatted, and generally is combatted, by increasing wages for teachers
statewide. 227 In a cross-sectional analysis of nationwide probation
periods and corresponding wages, Professors Eric J. Brunner of
Quinnipiac University and the University of Connecticut and Jennifer
Imazeki of San Diego University found that states with longer
probationary periods generally have higher teacher salaries as well. 228
Such measures help to combat the concerns and additional costs of a

221. Id.
222. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2007 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 6
(2008).
223. See Eric J. Brunner & Jennifer Imazeki, Probation Length and Teacher Salaries: Does
Waiting Pay Off?, 64 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW, Oct. 2010, 164; Molly
Robertson, Blaming Teacher Tenure is not the Answer, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 468 (stating that short
probationary period are effective and beneficial).
224. Id.
225. Ione L. Perry, Suppose We Lost Tenure, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, Dec. 1977, 185.
226. Anthony Rebora, Both Sides Now, Terminating Teacher Tenure, and a Sickening Ploy,
(Aug.
5,
2005)
http://www.edweek.org/tm/articles/
EDUCATION WEEK: TEACHER
2005/08/05/06webwatch_july22-aug4.html (quoting art teacher Lisa Kantor, who said that as a
probationary teacher “You know to a certain degree that you’re disposable. . .so you don’t speak up
at staff meetings, you don’t get political, and you mind your P’s and Q’s.”).
227. Brunner, supra note 223.
228. Id. at 179.
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prolonged period of evaluation and uncertainty. Though the professors
encourage state policymakers to remember that the state will bear the
costs of longer probationary periods (particularly in school districts that
lie close to the border of another state with a shorter probationary
period), 229 the costs of these measures, when compared to the benefits of
additional evaluation time free from judicial consequences, are arguably
justifiable. A system with a limited probationary period “rewards
longevity, not results.” 230
V. RECOMMENDATION: A ROAD MAP FOR FUTURE TEACHER TENURE
MODIFICATION
As it becomes necessary for states to either join the states who have
already made gains in improving their teacher tenure systems or to
revise recent modifications due to the problems like the ones previously
described, state legislatures will likely engage in a second wave of
legislation. Thus, having evaluated the different modifications that have
already been implemented, identifying their strengths and weaknesses,
this Comment concludes with a proposition for legislatures as they
consider the next wave of tenure reform. That proposition is a system
that awards tenure after a five-year probationary period based on
evaluations that measure teacher effectiveness by calculating a teacher’s
effect on student learning outcomes based on standardized testing in
comparison with those of the median across the state while evaluating
the effectiveness of classroom procedures and interactions through peerreview.
A. Require Teachers to Complete a Five-Year Probationary Period
First, the probationary period of five years complies with the
suggestion set forth by the National Council for Teacher Quality as an
appropriate length for evaluating effectiveness of teachers. 231
Additionally, though there are definite constitutional implications to a
probationary period that is too short, 232 there are no judicial
ramifications for a probationary period that is “too long,” if any such

229. Id.
230. Robert Gordon, Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Identifying Effective Teachers
Using Performance on the Job, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, April 2006, 16.
231. National Council on Teacher Quality, 2007 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 6
(2008).
232. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 Cal. Super. LEXIS 176, at *13-14 (June 10, 2014)
(tentative opinion).
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evaluation can be made.
One disadvantage to lengthening the probationary period is that
potential future teachers will perceive a longer probationary period as a
period of uncertainty and risk. 233 However, in states with longer
probationary periods, an effective way to combat the potential risk is to
offer higher salaries during the probationary period. 234
B. Utilize Peer-Evaluations in Making Employment Decisions
It is undeniable that test results and the accompanying statistics that
they provide are inseparable from our evaluations of schools as a
society. Being able to place an objective measure on something is
understandably appealing to decision-makers. However, due to the
inherent drawbacks regarding reliability and validity235 of many
standardized test results as well as the potential for costly litigation,236
legislatures should allow these results to have only a marginal effect on
whether a teacher attains and maintains tenure. Instead, this Comment
propose that states implement peer-review evaluations. Such evaluations
contribute substantial benefits to the overall achievement of the
“effectiveness” of the teaching profession.
The element of assistance is one major advantage to peer
evaluations because of the benefit it brings to the teachers, the school
districts and administrators, and the teaching profession. Not only are
peer evaluation methods less likely to lead to litigation, and therefore
save school districts (and the state) money, 237 but they also are more
likely to make ineffective teachers more effective. The added benefit of
a mentor during the pivotal probationary years will help teachers who
might be struggling to help their students perform well on standardized
tests or master material by giving them a resource to utilize.238
Additionally, placing the responsibility of evaluating teachers with other
teachers, rather than administrators or principals, combats the negative
233. Eric J. Brunner & Jennifer Imazeki, Probation Length and Teacher Salaries: Does
Waiting Pay Off?, 64 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW, Oct. 2010, 165.
234. Id. at 178-179.
235. See generally Bruce Baker, Joseph O. Oliwole & Preston C. Green, The Legal
Consequences of Mandating High Stakes Decisions Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher
Evaluation in the Race-to-the-Top Era, 21 EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jan.
28, 2013.
236. See generally infra Section III.
237. Susan Moore Johnson & Sarah E. Fiarman, The Potential of Peer Review, 70 TEACHER
EVALUATION: WHAT’S FAIR? WHAT’S EFFECTIVE?, Nov. 2012, 20-25 (reporting that districts
avoided litigation that generally costs districts $100,000 per teacher).
238. Id.
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aspects of current subjective observations and evaluations because
principals have neither the time nor the expertise to effectively evaluate,
let alone to help and mentor, under-performing teachers. 239
C. Prohibit Districts from Considering Seniority in Reduction-in-Force
Decisions
Finally, this Comment would propose that states follow the lead of
states such as Indiana and Michigan and allow the teacher’s tenure status
or seniority to be a factor only in termination decisions where
evaluations are insufficient to make a determination. 240
By following these proposals, a state will be able to take advantage
of a system that increases teacher effectiveness—which is the purported
intent behind the modifications surveyed in this Comment—at a low
cost to the state and local school districts. In terms of a cost-benefit
analysis, these three elements address the areas that are most ripe for
controversy in the teacher tenure debate in a way that downsizes the
potential cost to the school by decreasing the likelihood of expensive
litigation while also engaging teachers in innovative ways, thereby
setting the environment for innovation in other areas such as teaching
practices or other reforms.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Comment illustrates, the state of the nation with regard to
education policies, and specifically teacher tenure policies, is undergoing
an extensive shift. These shifts include a new emphasis on determining
and fostering teacher effectiveness in the classroom. To that end,
legislatures nationwide have implemented changes, such as: linking
teacher tenure and dismissal decisions to student and teacher
performance, increasing the probationary period before teachers can
obtain tenure, and prohibiting consideration of seniority in employment
decisions. However, some of these changes are not achieving the
intended result and there is much room for improvement. Therefore,
legislatures must consider other methods of increasing effectiveness and
retaining effective teachers.

239. See Rick DuFour & Mike Mattos, How Do Principals Really Improve Schools?, 70 THE
PRINCIPALSHIP, April 2013, 34-40.
240. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-28-7.5-1(c) (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.83b (West
2011);105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 24-12 (West 2015).
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